[地方财政][转贴]论地方政府间税收不当竞争的法律规制 [复制链接]

论地方政府间税收不当竞争的法律规制（一）
徐孟洲 叶姗

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【摘要】地方政府间税收竞争的产生，客观上基于财政分权的结果，主观上缘自地方政府绩效的考虑。对处在经济转型期的中国来说，虽然税权高度集中于中央，地方政府间税收竞争同样难以避免。若地方政府间税收竞争能遵循一定的秩序要求，无疑将有益于资源配置的优化和公共服务质量的提高。经济转型期制度约束环境的弱化与地方政府事权界定的模糊，使得税收竞争进退失据、容易逾越正当的界限。地方政府间的税收不当竞争亟待全面的法律规制，以便为税收竞争提供常规性的制度保障，符合“依法治税”精神。
【关键词】财政分权；政府绩效；税收竞争；税收不当竞争；法律规制
【正文】
　　地方政府间税收竞争，不仅常见于西方发达国家，而且存在于经济转型国家。对地方政府间税收竞争问题的研究，目前主要集中于经济学领域。法学上对地方政府间税收不当竞争的认识不足、研究较少。“法治是现代社会治理的最有效的办法，人类选择法制，就是使社会控制资源得以最大化利用，用惯例与常规来解决问题，使治理风险最小化、成本最小化。法律的规制、权力的分离和行政的透明，都是基于对人性的不信任和人们对自我有了清晰认识后所建立的他律机制。”[1]有鉴于此，本文在借鉴税收学上关于地方政府间税收竞争的研究成果的基础上，立足法学的研究视角，因循“为权利提供救济”、“给权力施加约束”的研究思路，探讨建立常规性规制地方政府间税收竞争有序进行的法律体系问题。

　　一、政府间税收竞争产生的主客观原因

　　经济学上的财政联邦制理论与政治学上的政府绩效管理制度，有助于全面把握政府间税收竞争的成因，只有这样，法学研究政府间税收竞争的法律规制问题时才能有的放矢。

　　（一）税收竞争客观上源于财政分权

　　“一个国家的财政结构是分散的或集中的，要视其政体是联邦制或单一制而定，而不是相反。”[2]单一制的特征是：一切地方政府的权力均来自于中央政府授予，地方政府的重要官员由中央任命；每一级政府只管理隶属于其的下一级政府，最基层的政府才直接统治人民。单一制国家的政府间结构关系传统上仅采取自上而下的单向控制模式。然而，联邦制所主张的双向控制或曰相互依赖模式，即通过设置协调机制或制度保障因素，来确保两个层级的政府之间既在政府组成、立法与执法等层面上相互依赖、利益上又各自相对独立。中国尽管仍然坚持单一制和中央集权，实际上的政府间关系更接近相互控制模式，有经济学者认为，中国经济转型所以取得相对成功，要归功于M 型体制结构[3]或曰“创造市场的准联邦制”。[4]

　　政府间财政关系即政府间的财权与财力划分及其相互关系。财权与财力在各级政府间的分配量度，直接关系到中央与地方各级政府各自利益的满足程度或实现程度，财权与财力的归属与分配，则涉及中央与地方各自利益及两者的对比度。[5]财政分权并非联邦制国家专属的，很多单一制国家也采取财政分权模式，而且分权化愈加明显。所谓财政分权，是指中央政府赋予地方政府在债务安排、税收管理和预算执行等一定的自主权。[6]财政分权理论旨在解释地方政府存在的合理性：中央政府不能够按照每个居民的偏好和资源条件供给公共产品，地方政府的存在有利于实现社会福利最大化。与发达国家通过宪法或法律界定各级政府事权的做法不同，经济转型国家的政府间财政关系因政府与市场的边界未定而极不稳定。

　　我国自1994 年实行分税制的财政体制改革以来，[7]财政分权改革逐步铺开；2003 年《中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》进一步指出：“在统一税政前提下，赋予地方适当的税政管理权”；[8]2006 年《国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要》再次肯定：“调整和规范中央与地方、地方各级政府间的收支关系，建立健全与事权相匹配的财税体制”、“加快公共财政体系建设，明确界定各级政府的财政支出责任，合理调整政府间财政收入划分”。[9]目前，我国宪法和法律尚未明确界定各级政府的事权以及与之相称的财权，未来政府间的财政关系还可能存在较大幅度的调整空间。

　　西方政府间财政关系的主要理论——财政联邦制理论，至今已产生了两代：传统理论和新近理论。[10]传统理论以蒂布特、马斯格雷夫、奥茨等理论为代表。蒂布特的“用脚投票”理论是财政分权的经典模型。“蒂布特理论”指出，从经济效率的角度来说，由地方政府提供地方性公共产品将更有效率。不是政府在适应选民，而是能吸引最优数量居民的政府可以被接纳。通过竞争，居民对公共产品的偏好得以揭示，公共产品提供效率从而得以提高。人们可能基于对地方政府所提供的公共物品与所征税收的比较，来选择居住区域，即“用脚投票”。马斯格雷夫指出，中央与地方政府分别提供全国性与地方性公共产品；具有外部性和规模经济的地方性公共产品，则由中央政府提供或由中央政府协调地方政府联合提供。奥茨认为，如果集中提供地方性公共产品不会节约成本，且不存在辖区间的外部性，那么每个辖区自己提供地方性公共产品至少与统一提供获得的福利一样高。[11]

　　如果说传统理论的精髓是通过财政分权、赋予地方政府更多责任来促进地方政府的竞争与经济效率的提高的话，新近理论则尝试运用企业理论分析政府激励问题。新近理论注意到发展中国家、经济转型国家的政府间关系比发达国家可能存在更多的问题。巴丹、温加斯特等学者认为，经济转型国家的人口流动性不强、公众的监督能力有限，地方政府的政治责任观念比较薄弱，地方政府征税水平和征管能力都较低。钱颖一等指出，财政联邦制作为一种承诺，具有维护市场有效体制的潜在力量，给市场维护提供激励。吕费斯曼将政府间财政关系视为不完全契约，认为若某一地方政府提供的公共产品有溢出效应的话，政策协调总是互惠的、可以增进地方收益。在没有成本分摊时，中央补助可起决定性作用，政治交易过程本身就可以消除低效率；而有成本分摊时，财政分权的效率则明显占优。

　　（二）税收竞争主观上源于政府绩效管理

　　存在于各种同时规范其行为的制度环境中的地方政府，其所以进行税收竞争，财政分权是客观因素。财政分权使得地方政府产生了相互独立的利益诉求，由此，有学者提出，在经济转型国家，特别是中国和俄罗斯，都存在地方政府作为产权主体的“地方产权制度”现象：由中央确定的货币政策都对解决财政矛盾起着关键作用，以及中央与地方政权之间存在着围绕税基和财政收入再分配的复杂的讨价还价现象。[12]税收竞争在经济转型国家出现，政治体制是另一个值得注意的因素，传统的政府考核机制让地方长官只须对上级而无须对辖区居民负责。真正的竞争往往发生在地方政府之间，而不是出现在省级政府与中央之间。甚至，中央政府还试图通过保护地方民众的利益，来更好地规范地方政府的行为。

　　政府绩效，是指运用“绩效”概念衡量而得出的政府活动的效果，指政府在社会管理活动中的结果、效益及其管理工作的效率、效能，是政府在行使其功能、实现其意志过程中体现出的管理能力。[13]政府绩效改革就是改变政府只是“照章办事”的传统风格，塑造有使命感的政府；即改变以过程为导向的控制机制，谋求以结果为导向的控制机制。政府绩效以取得的结果而不是以投入要素作为判断政府部门效率的标准。根据政府绩效评估的目标和评估标准，运用现代通讯技术，通过管理效率、管理能力、公共责任、公众的满意程度等价值判断来体现。[14]我们认为，政府绩效评估应当引入“以保护消费者权益为中心”的制度理念：政府部门应当对公共服务的消费者负责，公共消费者籍此对公共服务直接进行控制和选择。[15]

　　美国是世界上最先探索政府绩效管理的国家之一。政府绩效管理之所以兴起，财政压力是最直接的动机，公众期望的剧增敦促政府更加关心绩效，新的基础理论成果也为绩效改革提供了思想基础。美国1993年颁布、1994 年试行、2000 年全面实施的《政府绩效与结果法》是各国政府绩效改革浪潮中具有里程碑意义的代表性立法。[16]该法大力推动了美国政府绩效改革，政府绩效明显改善。政府绩效的评估指标包括公共决策的科学性、政策及法规的连续性、政府行为公开性、透明度以及公务员队伍的廉洁、务实、勤政、高效等。地方政府的绩效评估则是运用科学、规范的评价指标体系和评价方法，按照规定程序，对地方政府一定年限内的依法行政能力、经济发展、社会稳定等要素进行全面科学的定量及定性分析，作出真实、客观、公正的综合评判。[17]

　　为增进政府绩效，很多国家鼓励地方政府间开展税收竞争来提高公共部门的效率。从税收竞争对政府绩效产生的不同后果来看，政府间财政关系理论可以归纳为“增进效率说”与“降低效率说”两类。前者认为，税收竞争的结果会提高经济效率、增进社会和个人的福利水平。该说的典型是“蒂布特理论”，居民通过“用脚投票”向地方政府施加压力，迫使地方政府官员提供最优的财政收支组合，提高经济效率；而后者则认为税收竞争会降低经济效率、减少社会和个人的福利水平。该说的典型是奥茨理论，地方政府为吸引资本、竞相减税，使得靠税收融资的地方政府无法为最优的公共服务产出筹集到足够资金。上述理论都注意到了税收竞争在调动地方政府积极性上的作用，两者各有合理之处，区别在于研究起点不同。税收竞争的效果是增进还是降低效率虽无定论，但其本来目的是要增进政府绩效这一点是无疑的。因此，适当的税收竞争是一种较为可取的状态，税收竞争是必要的，但必须有限度。

　　二、税收竞争的限度与超限

　　财政分权与政府绩效增进必然引发政府间税收竞争。地方政府围绕具有流动性的生产要素展开竞争，包括制度环境、政策、区位、营销等在内的税收竞争战略旨在吸引资本、劳动和其他投入要素等，以提高社会与个人的公共福利。税收竞争，乃政府竞争手段之一。

　　（一）税收竞争的界定及其有限性要求

　　政府竞争，源于“竞争性政府”的概念，该概念最早见于英国学者阿尔伯特•布雷顿的著作《竞争性政府：一个政府财政的经济理论》：“联邦制国家中政府间关系在总体上看是存在竞争性的，政府之间、政府的内部部门之间以及政府与政府之外的行为主体之间迫于选民、经济主体和非经济主体的压力，必须供给合意的非市场供给的产品和服务，以满足当地居民和组织的要求。”[18]政府间竞争可以围绕技术与制度供给展开，通过基础设施建设、技术平台准备、服务制度构建以及各种税收优惠和营销策略等，不仅能够吸引居民与资源流入当地，而且能够使之稳定融入本地的社会网络。美国首席大法官约翰•马歇尔曾指出：“征税的权力事关毁灭的权力”。由此可见，税收与税权之重要性。

　　不少学者均尝试定义“国内的税收竞争”：有学者认为，广义上，税收竞争是指独立性的政府所采取的任何形式的非合作性税制设定行为；一般意义上，增加了一个限定条件，即要求每一个政府的税收政策能够影响税收收入在政府间的分配；狭义上，进一步限定了政府预算相互依赖性的原因：税收竞争是独立性政府的非合作型税制设定行为，每一个政府的政策选择都会影响流动性税基在这些政府所代表的地区间的配置。[19]另有学者认为，税收竞争是指不同政府之间为了特定的目标（吸引资本、吸引居民等），通过降低税收、增加公共支出或其他影响政府收支的方式而展开的竞争。[20]还有学者认为，税收竞争是指各地区通过竞相降低有效税率或实施有关税收优惠等途径，以吸引其他地区财源流入本地区的政府自利行为。[21]另有学者认为，税收竞争是指政府间以增强辖区政府的经济实力，增进辖区福利为主要目的，以税收及相关手段进行的各种争夺经济资源及税收资源的活动。[22]

　　上述税收竞争的定义，虽然并不完全相同，却已形成基本共识：在财政分权中不同地方政府利益各异的前提下，为达到增进政府绩效、增加公共福利水平等目的，采取各种税收优惠手段，吸引资本、扩大税基等，实现公共服务产出与财政收入的最优比例，即促使公共服务资源的配置实现最优化。如何有效、均衡地在政府间分配税收利益，从来都是税法的重要任务之一。无论是发达国家，还是经济转型或发展中国家，地方政府职能的实现都必须依靠地方政府的财政。事权与税权是否匹配是地方政府能否完成其应有事权的普适性标准。税收来源不同也会影响地方政府制定决策和提供公共服务的方式。税收竞争客观上可能增加地方政府用于提供公共服务的税源，但是，过度的税收竞争则可能使地方政府因提供过多税收优惠而无法获得税收增加，也就是说，即使税源增加，地方政府的财力仍可能下降。因此，税收竞争应当是有限度的，只有良性的税收竞争才有助于实现税收竞争增进财力的本来目的。

　　（二）中国经济转型期的税收不当竞争行为

　　政府间税收竞争与市场竞争一样，都必须遵循竞争规律和公认的道德准则。发达国家与经济转型国家的经济、社会发展阶段不同，政府间税收竞争的理论与具体实践亦有差异。对经济转型国家来说，地方政府间税收竞争对市场的发育与市场秩序的维持至关重要，发达国家相对成熟的立法与司法体制，可以为税收竞争提供成文的竞争规则以及规范的权力约束和权利保障。而经济转型国家，很多社会制度仍在不断的调试过程中，市场机制尚未完全建立、市场秩序不稳定且多有混乱。政治上的集权传统与财政上的分权改革并存，难免出现税收立法权虽高度集中在中央，但地方政府间税收竞争也屡见不鲜的奇景。税收竞争的矛盾在经济转型期表现得更为突出，因此，本文着重探讨中国经济转型期的税收不当竞争。从制度运行效果来看，过度的税收竞争不仅不会促进经济发展，而且会导致税收的大面积流失，故可称为“有害税收竞争（harmful tax competition）”或“税收不当竞争”、“税收竞争失当”等。“有害税收竞争”一词源于经济合作与发展组织（OECD）1998 年4 月提出的研究报告《有害税收竞争：一个日益突出的全球问题》，这是针对20 世纪80 年代起各国税制改革中出现的降低税率、提供各种税收优惠的普遍趋势，包括避税港与有害税收优惠等进行的专题研究。[23]而“税收不当竞争”、“税收竞争失当”的提法，则参照竞争法上的“不正当竞争”这一违反“以公平和诚实信用原则为核心的公认商业道德”的竞争行为的提法。

　　为与我国法律体系中惯常使用的法律术语保持一致，本文倾向采用“税收不当竞争”的概念。20 世纪70 年代末，中国启动渐进性的经济体制改革，现已取得巨大的经济成就。计划经济体制下的全能性政府、管制型政府向与市场经济相配套的有限型政府、服务型政府过渡，政府通过放弃由市场配置更有效率的领域来培育市场，地方积极性因获得发挥空间而得到释放，部分地区的经济率先发展，并且带动经济全面起飞。地方政府辖区内经济增长的重要原因是上下级政府之间直接的委托代理关系和经济转型期相对“软化”的制度约束环境。[24]相比之下，政治体制改革相对滞后，各级人大未能对同级政府构成有效的监督制约，上级政府对下级政府的人事任免仍有较大的发言权，而辖区内的纳税人与公共服务受益人也无法对地方政府进行有效监督。政府绩效的评估机制既不规范，也不科学。经济转型期的地方政府面临相对软化的制度约束环境，税收竞争作为发现更好制度的手段，不可能绝对消灭。从税收竞争的角度分析，经济转型中国的地方政府大致有三种类型：第一，进取型地方政府。这类地方政府主要依靠制度与技术创新、加强软环境建设来吸引税源，从而扩大税基。如沿海一些地区。第二，保护型地方政府。这类地方政府虽然也进行制度与技术创新，但创新能力有限，不足以吸收税源。为了保证一定的税基，常采取地方保护主义，依靠政府保护来创造当地企业的产品市场。如中部一些地区。第三，掠夺型地方政府。这类地方政府基本上很难创造新的税源，为维护政府的日常开支，不惜通过各种手段增加收费。财政上的困境使其陷入两难境地：一方面，搞活经济需加大投资公共设施、降低税负；另一方面，各种刚性财政支出迫使地方财政必须扩大或至少维持财政收入，税负不增反减。财政困境与经济发展水平形成相互遏制的格局。如果地方政府没有动力进行制度创新来打破这种格局，掠夺型政府可能持续更长时间。如湖北省赤壁市。[25]

　　2006 年3 月，湖北省汉川市政府办公室发布《关于倡导公务接待使用小糊涂仙系列酒的通知》，给市直机关和各乡镇农场下达喝酒任务，“全市各部门全年喝小糊涂仙系列酒价值总目标为200 万元，完成任务的按照10％的奖励，完不成的通报批评。”其原因在于：2005 年，生产销售小糊涂仙系列酒的湖北云峰酒业有限公司纳税超过1300 万，是该市纳税过千万的六家企业之一，但该酒的市场份额却偏低。该文件出台20 多天后，4 月6 日，市政府又出台了新文件，称“经研究决定，关于倡导公务接待使用小糊涂仙（神）系列酒的通知，从即日起废止执行。”这是政府角色错位的典型案例，背后最大的原因在于经济利益的驱动——典型的滥用公权力促进税收增长的手段。“喝酒令”虽然只存活了短短二十余天就不幸终结，但这一终结并非来自于规范的制度规制，而是来自于群众监督的力量：自媒体披露“喝酒令”以来，各方的反对意见不绝于耳。这一局面是正式制度缺失时规制税收竞争的权宜之计。

　　在中国，怎样杜绝税收不当竞争、提高税收竞争的效率是各地方政府面临的共同难题。地方政府税收竞争植根于改革过程中政治体制与经济体制改革不配套，反映在具体制度安排上，就是事权与财权的界限都比较模糊，这种不确定性不利于地方财政从长远利益考虑问题，导致地方政府间税收竞争的形式也在不断地调整，导致地方税收不当竞争的恶性后果。政治体制配套改革的关键是在现行体制框架下如何实现后两类竞争模式向第一类竞争模式的转换。重建地方政府税收竞争秩序的出发点是培育地方的经济竞争力，通过地方经济发展引导规范的政府行为。地区间竞争力来源于地方的资源、技术和制度，而起决定作用的则是制度。制度的创新会带动技术的创新与资源的流动，从而决定当地的经济增长。[26]

　　三、规制税收不当竞争行为的思路

　　构建规范政府间税收竞争秩序的法律制度框架，既可以保证税收竞争积极作用的发挥，也可以防止税收不当竞争引起的混乱。税收不当竞争问题的解决，遵循法学的思维范式，可以通过常规性地提供规范的税收法律制度，以完善规制税收竞争秩序的法律制度体系。

　　（一）税收不当竞争何以需要法律规制

　　相比发达国家“财权与事权的界限法定”的情况来说，我国政府间财权与事权的界限不明确，因此，地方政府选择的税收竞争方式，很容易受税权划分的意外变动和频繁调整的负面影响。换言之，地方政府因对中央缺乏必要信任，而不惜各显神通，在税源的争夺上大动脑筋。改革开放后到1994 年税制改革前，地方政府间税收竞争围绕着给外资提供税收减免优惠展开，表现出地方政府侵犯中央政府统一税权的特点；1994 年税制改革后，地方政府间税收竞争转向税收返还政策上的竞争，地方政府将税收返还给投资者，以吸引投资。

　　在发达国家，地方政府官员政绩的好坏主要由选民进行评价，其行为主要对当地选民负责，选民的满意程度是税收政策所要考虑的首要因素。我国现行官员考核机制使得税收政策更多的是要考虑上级官员的满意程度。处在经济转型期的中国，很多问题都依赖高速经济增长来解决。经济增长率，特别是国内生产总值（GDP），成为官员政绩评判的最重要指标。尽可能吸引外资，是保持经济高速增长的有效途径。地方官员不会把太多的心思放在提高辖区内社会总体与个人的公共服务质量上，地方政府间难免出现恶性的税收竞争。我国公共财政体制建设刚刚起步，税收竞争决策主要由行政机关及其官员作出，监督与制约都较为不足，即使行政机关作出错误决策，也没有责任需要承担，更遑论责任追究机制了。

　　针对上述问题，经济转型期的中国可以通过清晰界定各级政府间财权关系以及事权与财权的界限，降低地方税收竞争行动预期的不确定程度，促使地方政府选择有利于地方经济长远发展的税收竞争形式。另外，还需要引入“绿色GDP”等新指标来构建合理的地方官员政绩考核制度、提高税收竞争决策过程的民主程度、充分发挥同级人大的监督职能、完善预算的民主编制与有效执行。目前，地方保护主义已成为目前制约全国统一市场形成的最主要障碍。[27]大量以行政区划为界限的“地方政府经济圈”各自独立运行，使全国市场处于分割状态，商品与要素的自由流动严重受阻，市场机制在更大区域内优化资源配置的功能失效。[28]仅仅依靠行政措施和税收立法权集中的手段，不足以消除地方保护主义，更无法规制税收不当竞争。

　　各地自然条件和经济发展水平不平衡，财政能力和税源情况有很大差别，可赋予地方适当的立法权。税收立法权全部集中于中央，财政分权不彻底，某种程度上加重了税收不当竞争。中央税和共享税的税收立法权和税收政策制定可以集中在中央，但对一些地域性的、较为零散的税源则可以通过地方立法来征税。大税种的统一性对维持国内统一大市场有重要意义，对于地方税种，则可考虑中央只负责制定这些地方税税种的基本税法，如确定税目税率的可调整范围，税收减免的幅度、范围等，但具体实施办法、税目、税率调整、税收减免及其征收管理等权限应赋予地方。29有关地方税的税权若能明确下放，不仅能给地方政府适当的税收空间，也有利于循合法渠道解决目前地方财政困难与严重的“费挤税”、“重费轻税”现象。[30]

　　行政权与司法权的根本区别在于：行政权是管理权，司法权是判断权。判断的前提是关于真假、是非、曲直所引发的争端的存在。税收是行政权的管理行动之一，司法判断是针对真与假、是与非、曲与直等问题，根据特定的证据（事实）与既定的规则，通过一定的程序进行认识。[31]司法权作为一种判断权，不仅应独立于行政权，而且可以给行政权必要的监督。依法行政迫切需要强化司法权对行政权的制约力度。西方国家践行三权分立、以权力制约权力的理念。中国虽实行议行合一的制度，但并不排除权力的分工与监督，在权力制约机制中，行政权按照立法权提供的方向行使权力，司法权按照立法权赋予的标准行使权力。目前，司法权对行政权的监督主要是指对行政案件的审理——即对行政权具体行政行为的司法审查。司法是一个国家社会公道实现和公民权利救济的“最后堡垒”，一个社会的法治发育程度往往以司法能够容纳和解决社会问题的深度和广度为衡量的重要依据。司法不是万能的，也始终不是最优的纠纷解决手段，但没有司法是万万不能的，“司法是公认的维护社会正义的最后一道防线”。

　　中央与地方关系是中国长期面临的一个问题。中央政府拥有强大的独立执行力量的同时，完全可以放心地让地方政府拥有更大的自主权。“十一五规划”对政府间税收竞争虽无规定，但责任政府观念与政府问责制的确立，反映了立法与行政尝试通过内部设计体制保障因素和相互依赖机制来化解或消灭政府间权力冲突。一个政府，不论其权力来自于人民通过投票表达的明确授权，还是人民的默示同意，都应该是一个可以问责的政府。政府的权力与义务必须平衡，不能要求政府对实际上不能完全自主决定的事物负责任，也不能使政府做最终不必自身承担后果的决策。当然，仅仅通过立法和行政来调整税收竞争，是不够的，适当引入司法调节方式，可以避免政府间直接对抗的不利因素，也可以弥补立法和行政的不足。尽管司法的现状不尽如人意：存在司法独立性不够、司法权不统一等种种问题。然而，“价值判断”毕竟是司法权的本质所在，司法权协同配合立法权与行政权是必须且可行的。

　　（二）法律怎样规制税收不当竞争

　　要素流动日益频繁和技术与信息的飞速发展，加快了税基的地域流动，导致地方政府为争夺流动性资源而引发税收竞争。税收竞争使地方政府间的行为相互制约，客观上促进了资源的优化配置。对政府间税收竞争进行正当与否的价值判断，既需要理论上的判定标准，也需要实践上的认识准则。32可以构建一系列客观指标来判断税收竞争是否不当：如果税收竞争会侵蚀税基、扭曲税负或资本流向、阻碍资源流动、增加征税成本的话，这样的税收竞争就应被视为“不当”。如果要从司法规制的角度来达到减少甚至消灭政府间税收不当竞争的目的的话，至少有两个途径：通过地方政府间直接诉讼与通过裁决私人间或私人与政府间诉讼来间接协调政府间财政关系。理论上说，两种途径都是可行的，但实际上并不尽然。

　　司法权的属性决定了其不宜对所有争议进行审查，除了法律上特别承认的情况外，应该将其审查范围限定于“法律上的争讼”：必须存在法主体之间的有关法律利益的具体争讼或必须存在通过法律判断能够解决的争讼。[33]当中央与地方的立法都直接适用于个人，政府间的权限冲突可能使法律冲突以私人或私人与政府间利益纠纷的形式大量表现出来，不必而且大多数情况下不以两者之间直接对抗的形式体现。即使是美国这种典型的联邦制国家，其最重要的关于联邦和州之间权力范围调整的判例，往往不是直接发生在两个政府之间的诉讼，而是涉及个人利益的案件或纯粹是私人间的诉讼。政治制度的设计如果让联邦与州政府直接面对面对抗，就会导致国家的危机。如果这种危机通过立法机关解决，将会更加陷入僵局。这从联合国与国际法院在解决国家间冲突上的不佳效果可见一斑。[34]

　　对处在经济转型期的中国来说，消除地方政府间的税收不当竞争现象，不能完全依赖上下级政府及其官员之间的制约和合作，而应通过设立专门的司法机构或者准司法机构，适当借助司法规制的手段来解决问题。财政分权虽使各地方政府产生了利益对立的状况，单一制国家结构形式却很难与地方政府为各自利益直接对簿公堂的机制并存。概言之，一项不当的税收竞争制度安排，不可能丝毫无损于私人利益。若能给合法的私人利益提供司法救济的途径，各种损害全国性市场统一的地方保护主义措施将受到间接但有效的遏制。例如遭受地区封锁的侵害或产品碰到市场准入的限制或歧视待遇的企业，如有权对其他私人主体或相关政府机关提起诉讼主张，则这些地方保护主义措施就不得不接受司法机构的价值判断了。司法规制税收不当竞争必须具有实体法上的依据，政府间税权配置与权力利益关系都需要法制化，以形成政府间长期稳定的、超越个人关系的相互信任关系。为确保地区间公共服务的均等化，在财政分权的基础上，应继续推行与深化财税体制改革，具体来说，“合理界定各级政府的事权，调整和规范中央与地方、地方各级政府间的收支关系，建立健全与事权相匹配的财税体制。调整财政支出结构，加快公共财政体系建设。完善中央和省级政府的财政转移支付制度，理顺省级以下财政管理体制，有条件的地方可实行省级直接对县的管理体制。”[35]正在酝酿制定的《税法通则》，作为税法领域具有基本法性质的立法，亦应考虑设置专门规制税收不当竞争的法律条文，以表明税法“鼓励和保护地方政府间正当税收竞争，制止不正当税收竞争行为”的基本立场，保护各地方政府及其辖区居民的合法权益、保障财税分权价值目标的顺利实现、协助实现地区公共服务的均等化。经济转型期暴露出来的种种被称为“行政垄断”的现象，[36]一直为多年来反复酝酿的《反垄断法》所关注，甚至一度被列入《反垄断法》草案，亦被认为是《反垄断法》所以迟迟未能获得通过的最大难点。有学者认为，“建立和完善全国统一、公平竞争、规范有序的市场体系”应成为《反垄断法》的首要任务，并应“专章用列举加概括的方式明令禁止各种形式的行政垄断”，“抽象性行政垄断纠纷应纳入受案范围，扩大对行政垄断受害人的司法救济范围”。[37]行政垄断是当前我国最严重的垄断形式，但要不要在《反垄断法》中对此进行规制，则一直存在两派针锋相对的意见。《反垄断法》草案一开始就有专章规定“反行政垄断”。最新一稿的《反垄断法》草案将“禁止滥用行政权力限制竞争”一章——即通常所谓的“反行政垄断”——整体删除。相应的法律责任也逐一删去。仅在总则中保留一条宣示性规定：“禁止行政机关和法律、法规授权的具有管理公共事务职能的组织滥用行政权力，实施排除或限制竞争的行为。”对行政垄断问题进行多番激烈争论后，“改革消除论”最终战胜了“立法规制论”。[38]行政垄断是政府间税收不当竞争的一个外在突出表现，《反垄断法》的立法过程再次验证了司法规制税收不当竞争的难度所在。在德国和美国，反垄断当局的财政与职权上都有很大的独立性，各自强大的司法体系亦为反垄断提供了可行的途径。相比之下，我国存在严重的地方保护主义，却无法提供相应的司法救济渠道。我国法院系统地方化，无论是其产生还是财政来源，都受制于地方政府，法院独立性难以确定，不可能审查抽象行政行为，无法为税收不当竞争的受害人提供充分的司法救济。本文认为，如能建立属于中央法院系统的巡回法院并保障巡回法院中的法官独立于地方政府的法律地位，巡回法院才可能对地方性法规、规章进行一定意义上的司法审查，通过典型个案累积的方式逐步实现对“地方保护主义”现象彻底否定的目的。司法可以也理应成为市场秩序的守护者。简言之，司法规制税收不当竞争可以通过税收不当竞争的受害人提起的民事诉讼或行政诉讼，甚至公益诉讼来实现。

　　结 论

　　如果仅仅以GDP 的指标来衡量，中国地方间税收竞争的确对中国经济发展取得的瞩目成就贡献良多。地方政府长期主导资源配置、充当经济建设和投资主体角色，堪称“经济建设型政府”。然而，经济发展的衡量标准不应局限于单一指标，我国地方政府正逐渐向“公共服务型政府”转变，地方政府也渐渐意识到“合纵连横”的重要性：陆续展开区域经济合作。2005 年底的中央经济工作会议上，中央明确提出“要建立全国统一的市场”，重新调整经济区域划分。可以预见，区域经济合作将会改善目前的地方政府间关系。政府间的竞争、合作与联动是政府间围绕着稀缺的资源展开的，即便是合作，法律规制仍是不可或缺的。因为，法律规制是实现公正的重要手段和保障，规范的法律规制将会有力地促进社会和谐。

　　

【作者简介】
    徐孟洲，中国人民大学法学院教授，博士生导师；叶姗，中国人民大学法学院博士研究生，华南师范大学法学院讲师。
【注释】
　 [1]刘宪权：《司法公正：“绿色权力”的制度保障——刘宪权教授在华东政法学院的演讲》，《解放日报》2005年5月29日，第8版。　
　 [2] [美]理查德•A•马斯格雷夫著，董勤发译：《比较财政分析》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1996 年版，第325 页。　
　 [3]M 型结构是指财政立法权集中于中央，但具体的财政收支工作由各地方具有相对独立地位的财务中心来完成。参见钱颖一、罗兰穗　
　和许成钢：《M型和U型组织的协调性变革》，《现代企业理论与中国经济改革》，社会科学文献出版社1997 年版。　
　 [4]从政治体制上说，中国明显是一个单一制国家，但随着改革的不断创新，中国的财政体制吸收了不少财政分权的因素，而命名为“分税制”的财政体制改革，更反映了分权因素逐渐渗入政治体制改革的趋势。　
　 [5]寇铁军：《关于中央与地方财政关系的定性分析》，《财经问题研究》1997 年第11 期，第32 页。　
　 [6]张靖华：《西方财政分权理论综述》，《开发研究》2005 年第2 期，第114 页。　
　 [7]《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》（[1993]国发第85 号）（1993 年12 月15 日）　
　 [8]中共中央第十六届三中全会《关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》（2004 年10 月21 日）　
　 [9]中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要》（2006 年3 月16 日）。　
　 [10]关于财政联邦制的诸理论，参见杨志勇著：《比较财政学》，复旦大学出版社2005 年版。　
　 [11]毛程连主编：《西方财政思想史》，经济科学出版社2003 年版，第397-419 页。　
　 [12]Carsten Herrmann-Pillath 著，陈凌译：《政府竞争：大国体制转型理论的分析范式》，德国维滕大学讨论文稿，1999 年第42 期。　
　 [13]颜如春：《关于建立我国政府绩效评估体系的思考》，《行政论坛》2003 年第9 期，第17 页。　
　 [14]朱火弟、蒲勇健：《政府绩效评估研究》，《改革》，2003 年第6 期第18-22 页。　
　 [15]关于“以消费者保护为中心构造经济法的体系”的论述，参见徐孟洲、谢增毅：《论消费者及消费者保护在经济法中的地位——“以人为本”理念与经济法主体和体系的新思考》，《现代法学》2005 年第4 期，第122-128 页。　
　 [16]Government Performance and Results Act of 1993”，详见美国白宫“管理与预算办公室”（Office of Management and Budget，简称OMB）网站，http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html。　
　 [17]王良健、侯文力：《地方政府绩效评估指标体系及评估方法研究》，《软科学》2005 年第4 期，第11-14 页。　
　 [18]Albert Breton. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politic Finance. Cambridge University Press. 1996.　
　 [19]John D. Wilson, David E. Wildasin. Tax Competition: Bane or Boon.The office of tax policy research/institute for fiscal studies conference, “World tax competition”, held on May 24-25, 2001，London，UK：P2- P3.　
　 [20]杨志勇著：《比较财政学》，复旦大学出版社2005 年版，第217 页。　
　 [21]张会萍：《审视税收竞争》，《税务研究》2001 年第7 期，第8 页。　
　 [22]周克清：《政府间税收竞争及其界定》，《吉林财税高等专科学校学报》2005 年第2 期，第18 页。　
　 [23]“1998 Harmful Tax Competition：A emerging global issue”，http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/1/1904184.pdf。　
　 [24]李军杰、周卫峰：《基于政府间竞争的地方政府经济行为分析——以“铁本事件”为例》，《经济社会体制比较》2005 年第1 期，第49-54 页。　
　 [25]周业安、赵晓男：《地方政府竞争模式研究——构建地方政府间良性竞争秩序的理论和政策分析》，《管理世界》2002 年第11 期，第7-10 页。　
　 [26]当然，促成中国20 多年来经济高速增长的原因很复杂，决不是某一个别因素使然。税收竞争只是其中之一。　
　 [27]2006年4月，黑龙江省哈尔滨市针对公务用车配备规定：各地区、各部门、各单位更新或新增轿车时，一律购买哈飞赛豹轿车；各级公安、交通、税务、工商、物价、国土资源、环保、质量技术监督、食品药品监管和安全生产监管等部门的执法用车，一律购买哈飞汽车；各地区、各部门、各单位购买除赛豹轿车以外的哈飞汽车不受车辆编制限制。对购置哈飞赛豹轿车以外车型的小轿车，各级财政部门一律不予安排资金，不予办理定编控购手续，公安车管部门不予办理车辆落户手续。这是一起非常典型的地方保护主义案例。　
　 [28]《透视“地方政府经济圈”行为异化现象》，《经济参考报》2004 年7 月12 日。　
　 [29]苏明：《中国地方税税权划分研究》，《涉外税务》2000 年第5 期，第20-25 页。　
　 [30]中国目前“费挤税”的现象有多严重、“地方政府举债”的情形有多普遍，难以一一量化反映。某种程度上说，这些正是税权和事权配置不匹配的典型反映，是地方政府“迫于无奈”的选择。当然，“无奈而为”并不能成为地方政府“重费轻税”、“非法举债”的合理理由。规范政府非税收入的取得方式，固然是一种解决办法，但这只是治标之计，而非治本之招。目前，基层的县乡两级政府承担了大量的事权，自主收入却严重不足，是经济转型期地方政府间的突出矛盾所在。　
　 [31]孙笑侠：《司法权的本质是判断权——司法权与行政权的十大区别》，《法学》1998 年第8 期，第34 页。　
　 [32]OECD 通过国际间有害税收竞争的研究报告，明确列举了判断几个标准，可供参考：对所得实行低税率或零税率、税收制度封闭保守、税制运作缺乏透明度、不能有效地与其他国家进行信息交流。　
　 [33]杨建顺：《公共选择理论与司法权的界限》，《法学论坛》2003 年第3 期，第12 页。　
　 [34]刘海波：《中央与地方政府间关系的司法调节》，《法学研究》2004 年第5 期，第36 页。　
　 [35]参见《国民经济与社会发展第十一个五年规划》（2006－2010），2006 年3 月。　
　 [36]通说认为，“行政垄断”一般指行政机关和法律、法规授权的具有管理公共事务职能的组织滥用行政权力，实施排除或限制竞争的行为。　
　 [37]黄欣：《反垄断法应当具有先进性》，《法制日报》2001 年9 月18 日，第3 版。　
　 [38]“改革消除论”认为，《反垄断法》应将目标集中在经济垄断，而不包括行政垄断，行政垄断本质上由转轨时期政治经济体制的过渡性造成，也必须通过进一步的体制改革来消除。“立法规制论”认为，反垄断立法必须注意中国国情，除了规制垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位、控制企业合并等经济垄断外，《反垄断法》必须对规制目前非常严重的行政垄断：明确反对行业垄断和地区封锁。　 
【出处】原载于《政治与法律》2006 年第6 期。

Government Performance Results Act of 1993
Contents
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
SECTION 3. STRATEGIC PLANNING.
SECTION 4. ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS AND REPORTS.
SECTION 5. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY.
SECTION 6. PILOT PROJECTS.
SECTION 7. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE.
SECTION 8. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION.
SECTION 9. TRAINING.
SECTION 10. APPLICATION OF ACT.
SECTION 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
Return to OMB Title page of guidance to agencies

[Although there are minor coding and format problems that resulted from the translation of the original code into ASCII, these should not interfere with the use of this file to gain an understanding of the content of the law.]


One Hundred Third Congress
of the
United States of America

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.


An Act

To provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the Federal Government, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993".

SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) Findings.-The Congress finds that-

(1) waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of the American people in the Government and reduces the Federal Government's ability to address adequately vital public needs;
(2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program performance; and
(3) congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program performance and results.

(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to-

(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results;
(2) initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;
(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction;
(4) help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with information about program results and service quality;
(5) improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and
(6) improve internal management of the Federal Government.

SECTION 3. STRATEGIC PLANNING.

Chapter 3 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 305 the following new section:

"Sec. 306. Strategic plans

"(a) No later than September 30, 1997, the head of each agency shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic plan for program activities. Such plan shall contain-

"(1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and operations of the agency;

"(2) general goals and objectives, including outcome- related goals and objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency;

"(3) a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet those goals and objectives;

"(4) a description of how the performance goals included in the plan required by section 1115(a) of title 31 shall be related to the general goals and objectives in the strategic plan;

"(5) an identification of those key factors external to the agency and beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives; and

"(6) a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations.

"(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than five years forward from the fiscal year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised at least every three years.

"(c) The performance plan required by section 1115 of title 31 shall be consistent with the agency's strategic plan. A performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not covered by a current strategic plan under this section.

"(d) When developing a strategic plan, the agency shall consult with the Congress, and shall solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially affected by or interested in such a plan.

"(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The drafting of strategic plans under this section shall be performed only by Federal employees.

"(f) For purposes of this section the term 'agency' means an Executive agency defined under section 105, but does not include the Central Intelligence Agency, the General Accounting Office, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.".

SECTION 4. ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS AND REPORTS.

(a) Budget Contents and Submission to Congress.-Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(29) beginning with fiscal year 1999, a Federal Government performance plan for the overall budget as provided for under section 1115.".

(b) Performance Plans and Reports.-Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 1114 the following new sections:

"Sec. 1115. Performance plans

"(a) In carrying out the provisions of section 1105(a)(29), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall require each agency to prepare an annual performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the budget of such agency. Such plan shall-

"(1) establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved by a program activity;

"(2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form unless authorized to be in an alternative form under subsection (b);

"(3) briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, or other resources required to meet the performance goals;

"(4) establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity;

"(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established performance goals; and

"(6) describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values.

"(b) If an agency, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines that it is not feasible to express the performance goals for a particular program activity in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may authorize an alternative form. Such alternative form shall-

"(1) include separate descriptive statements of-

"(A)(i) a minimally effective program, and

"(ii) a successful program, or

"(B) such alternative as authorized by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, with sufficient precision and in such terms that would allow for an accurate, independent determination of whether the program activity's performance meets the criteria of the description; or

"(2) state why it is infeasible or impractical to express a performance goal in any form for the program activity.

"(c) For the purpose of complying with this section, an agency may aggregate, disaggregate, or consolidate program activities, except that any aggregation or consolidation may not omit or minimize the significance of any program activity constituting a major function or operation for the agency.

"(d) An agency may submit with its annual performance plan an appendix covering any portion of the plan that-

"(1) is specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and

"(2) is properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

"(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The drafting of performance plans under this section shall be performed only by Federal employees.

"(f) For purposes of this section and sections 1116 through 1119, and sections 9703 and 9704 the term-

"(1) 'agency' has the same meaning as such term is defined under section 306(f) of title 5;

"(2) 'outcome measure' means an assessment of the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose;

"(3) 'output measure' means the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner;

"(4) 'performance goal' means a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, or rate;

"(5) 'performance indicator' means a particular value or characteristic used to measure output or outcome;

"(6) 'program activity' means a specific activity or project as listed in the program and financing schedules of the annual budget of the United States Government; and

"(7) 'program evaluation' means an assessment, through objective measurement and systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which Federal programs achieve intended objectives.

"Sec. 1116. Program performance reports

"(a) No later than March 31, 2000, and no later than March 31 of each year thereafter, the head of each agency shall prepare and submit to the President and the Congress, a report on program performance for the previous fiscal year.

"(b)(1) Each program performance report shall set forth the performance indicators established in the agency performance plan under section 1115, along with the actual program performance achieved compared with the performance goals expressed in the plan for that fiscal year.

"(2) If performance goals are specified in an alternative form under section 1115(b), the results of such program shall be described in relation to such specifications, including whether the performance failed to meet the criteria of a minimally effective or successful program.

"(c) The report for fiscal year 2000 shall include actual results for the preceding fiscal year, the report for fiscal year 2001 shall include actual results for the two preceding fiscal years, and the report for fiscal year 2002 and all subsequent reports shall include actual results for the three preceding fiscal years.

"(d) Each report shall-

"(1) review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal year;

"(2) evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to the performance achieved toward the performance goals in the fiscal year covered by the report;

"(3) explain and describe, where a performance goal has not been met (including when a program activity's performance is determined not to have met the criteria of a successful program activity under section 1115(b)(1)(A)(ii) or a corresponding level of achievement if another alternative form is used)-

"(A) why the goal was not met;

"(B) those plans and schedules for achieving the established performance goal; and

"(C) if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible, why that is the case and what action is recommended;

"(4) describe the use and assess the effectiveness in achieving performance goals of any waiver under section 9703 of this title; and

"(5) include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed during the fiscal year covered by the report.

"(e) An agency head may include all program performance information required annually under this section in an annual financial statement required under section 3515 if any such statement is submitted to the Congress no later than March 31 of the applicable fiscal year.

"(f) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The drafting of program performance reports under this section shall be performed only by Federal employees.

"Sec. 1117. Exemption

"The Director of the Office of Management and Budget may exempt from the requirements of sections 1115 and 1116 of this title and section 306 of title 5, any agency with annual outlays of $20,000,000 or less.".

SECTION 5. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY.

(a) Managerial Accountability and Flexibility.-Chapter 97 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 9702, the following new section:

"Sec. 9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility

"(a) Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans required under section 1115 may include proposals to waive administrative procedural requirements and controls, including specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions on funding transfers among budget object classification 20 and subclassifications 11, 12, 31, and 32 of each annual budget submitted under section 1105, in return for specific individual or organization accountability to achieve a performance goal. In preparing and submitting the performance plan under section 1105(a)(29), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall review and may approve any proposed waivers. A waiver shall take effect at the beginning of the fiscal year for which the waiver is approved.

"(b) Any such proposal under subsection (a) shall describe the anticipated effects on performance resulting from greater managerial or organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority, and shall quantify the expected improvements in performance resulting from any waiver. The expected improvements shall be compared to current actual performance, and to the projected level of performance that would be achieved independent of any waiver.

"(c) Any proposal waiving limitations on compensation or remuneration shall precisely express the monetary change in compensation or remuneration amounts, such as bonuses or awards, that shall result from meeting, exceeding, or failing to meet performance goals.

"(d) Any proposed waiver of procedural requirements or controls imposed by an agency (other than the proposing agency or the Office of Management and Budget) may not be included in a performance plan unless it is endorsed by the agency that established the requirement, and the endorsement included in the proposing agency's performance plan.

"(e) A waiver shall be in effect for one or two years as specified by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in approving the waiver. A waiver may be renewed for a subsequent year. After a waiver has been in effect for three consecutive years, the performance plan prepared under section 1115 may propose that a waiver, other than a waiver of limitations on compensation or remuneration, be made permanent.

"(f) For purposes of this section, the definitions under section 1115(f) shall apply.".

SECTION 6. PILOT PROJECTS.

(a) Performance Plans and Reports.-Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1117 (as added by section 4 of this Act) the following new section:

"Sec. 1118. Pilot projects for performance goals

"(a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after consultation with the head of each agency, shall designate not less than ten agencies as pilot projects in performance measurement for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996. The selected agencies shall reflect a representative range of Government functions and capabilities in measuring and reporting program performance.

"(b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall undertake the preparation of performance plans under section 1115, and program performance reports under section 1116, other than section 1116(c), for one or more of the major functions and operations of the agency. A strategic plan shall be used when preparing agency performance plans during one or more years of the pilot period.

"(c) No later than May 1, 1997, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit a report to the President and to the Congress which shall-

"(1) assess the benefits, costs, and usefulness of the plans and reports prepared by the pilot agencies in meeting the purposes of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993;

"(2) identify any significant difficulties experienced by the pilot agencies in preparing plans and reports; and

"(3) set forth any recommended changes in the requirements of the provisions of Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, section 306 of title 5, sections 1105, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1119 and 9703 of this title, and this section.".

(b) Managerial Accountability and Flexibility.-Chapter 97 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 9703 (as added by section 5 of this Act) the following new section:

"Sec. 9704. Pilot projects for managerial accountability and flexibility

"(a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall designate not less than five agencies as pilot projects in managerial accountability and flexibility for fiscal years 1995 and 1996. Such agencies shall be selected from those designated as pilot projects under section 1118 and shall reflect a representative range of Government functions and capabilities in measuring and reporting program performance.

"(b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall include proposed waivers in accordance with section 9703 for one or more of the major functions and operations of the agency.

"(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall include in the report to the President and to the Congress required under section 1118(c)-

"(1) an assessment of the benefits, costs, and usefulness of increasing managerial and organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority in exchange for improved performance through a waiver; and

"(2) an identification of any significant difficulties experienced by the pilot agencies in preparing proposed waivers.

"(d) For purposes of this section the definitions under section 1115(f) shall apply.".

(c) Performance Budgeting.-Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1118 (as added by section 6 of this Act) the following new section:

"Sec. 1119. Pilot projects for performance budgeting

"(a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after consultation with the head of each agency shall designate not less than five agencies as pilot projects in performance budgeting for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. At least three of the agencies shall be selected from those designated as pilot projects under section 1118, and shall also reflect a representative range of Government functions and capabilities in measuring and reporting program performance.

"(b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall cover the preparation of performance budgets. Such budgets shall present, for one or more of the major functions and operations of the agency, the varying levels of performance, including outcome-related performance, that would result from different budgeted amounts.

"(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall include, as an alternative budget presentation in the budget submitted under section 1105 for fiscal year 1999, the performance budgets of the designated agencies for this fiscal year.

"(d) No later than March 31, 2001, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall transmit a report to the President and to the Congress on the performance budgeting pilot projects which shall-

"(1) assess the feasibility and advisability of including a performance budget as part of the annual budget submitted under section 1105;

"(2) describe any difficulties encountered by the pilot agencies in preparing a performance budget;

"(3) recommend whether legislation requiring performance budgets should be proposed and the general provisions of any legislation; and

"(4) set forth any recommended changes in the other requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, section 306 of title 5, sections 1105, 1115, 1116, 1117, and 9703 of this title, and this section.

"(e) After receipt of the report required under subsection (d), the Congress may specify that a performance budget be submitted as part of the annual budget submitted under section 1105.".

SECTION 7. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE.

Part III of title 39, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new chapter:

"CHAPTER 28-STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

"Sec.

"2801. Definitions.

"2802. Strategic plans.

"2803. Performance plans.

"2804. Program performance reports.

"2805. Inherently Governmental functions.

"Sec. 2801. Definitions

"For purposes of this chapter the term-

"(1) 'outcome measure' refers to an assessment of the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose;

"(2) 'output measure' refers to the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner;

"(3) 'performance goal' means a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement shall be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, or rate;

"(4) 'performance indicator' refers to a particular value or characteristic used to measure output or outcome;

"(5) 'program activity' means a specific activity related to the mission of the Postal Service; and

"(6) 'program evaluation' means an assessment, through objective measurement and systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which Postal Service programs achieve intended objectives.

"Sec. 2802. Strategic plans

"(a) No later than September 30, 1997, the Postal Service shall submit to the President and the Congress a strategic plan for its program activities. Such plan shall contain-

"(1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and operations of the Postal Service;

"(2) general goals and objectives, including outcome- related goals and objectives, for the major functions and operations of the Postal Service;

"(3) a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet those goals and objectives;

"(4) a description of how the performance goals included in the plan required under section 2803 shall be related to the general goals and objectives in the strategic plan;

"(5) an identification of those key factors external to the Postal Service and beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives; and

"(6) a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations.

"(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than five years forward from the fiscal year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised at least every three years.

"(c) The performance plan required under section 2803 shall be consistent with the Postal Service's strategic plan. A performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not covered by a current strategic plan under this section.

"(d) When developing a strategic plan, the Postal Service shall solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially affected by or interested in such a plan, and shall advise the Congress of the contents of the plan.

"Sec. 2803. Performance plans

"(a) The Postal Service shall prepare an annual performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the Postal Service budget, which shall be included in the comprehensive statement presented under section 2401(g) of this title. Such plan shall-

"(1) establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved by a program activity;

"(2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form unless an alternative form is used under subsection (b);

"(3) briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, or other resources required to meet the performance goals;

"(4) establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity;

"(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established performance goals; and

"(6) describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values.

"(b) If the Postal Service determines that it is not feasible to express the performance goals for a particular program activity in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, the Postal Service may use an alternative form. Such alternative form shall-

"(1) include separate descriptive statements of-

"(A) a minimally effective program, and

"(B) a successful program,

with sufficient precision and in such terms that would allow for an accurate, independent determination of whether the program activity's performance meets the criteria of either description; or

"(2) state why it is infeasible or impractical to express a performance goal in any form for the program activity.

"(c) In preparing a comprehensive and informative plan under this section, the Postal Service may aggregate, disaggregate, or consolidate program activities, except that any aggregation or consolidation may not omit or minimize the significance of any program activity constituting a major function or operation.

"(d) The Postal Service may prepare a non-public annex to its plan covering program activities or parts of program activities relating to-

"(1) the avoidance of interference with criminal prosecution; or

"(2) matters otherwise exempt from public disclosure under section 410(c) of this title.

"Sec. 2804. Program performance reports

"(a) The Postal Service shall prepare a report on program performance for each fiscal year, which shall be included in the annual comprehensive statement presented under section 2401(g) of this title.

"(b)(1) The program performance report shall set forth the performance indicators established in the Postal Service performance plan, along with the actual program performance achieved compared with the performance goals expressed in the plan for that fiscal year.

"(2) If performance goals are specified by descriptive statements of a minimally effective program activity and a successful program activity, the results of such program shall be described in relationship to those categories, including whether the performance failed to meet the criteria of either category.

"(c) The report for fiscal year 2000 shall include actual results for the preceding fiscal year, the report for fiscal year 2001 shall include actual results for the two preceding fiscal years, and the report for fiscal year 2002 and all subsequent reports shall include actual results for the three preceding fiscal years.

"(d) Each report shall-

"(1) review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal year;

"(2) evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to the performance achieved towards the performance goals in the fiscal year covered by the report;

"(3) explain and describe, where a performance goal has not been met (including when a program activity's performance is determined not to have met the criteria of a successful program activity under section 2803(b)(2))-

"(A) why the goal was not met;

"(B) those plans and schedules for achieving the established performance goal; and

"(C) if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible, why that is the case and what action is recommended; and

"(4) include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed during the fiscal year covered by the report.

"Sec. 2805. Inherently Governmental functions

"The functions and activities of this chapter shall be considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The drafting of strategic plans, performance plans, and program performance reports under this section shall be performed only by employees of the Postal Service.".

SECTION 8. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION.

(a) In General.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting the ability of Congress to establish, amend, suspend, or annul a performance goal. Any such action shall have the effect of superseding that goal in the plan submitted under section 1105(a)(29) of title 31, United States Code.

(b) GAO Report.-No later than June 1, 1997, the Comptroller General of the United States shall report to Congress on the implementation of this Act, including the prospects for compliance by Federal agencies beyond those participating as pilot projects under sections 1118 and 9704 of title 31, United States Code.

SECTION 9. TRAINING.

The Office of Personnel Management shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Comptroller General of the United States, develop a strategic planning and performance measurement training component for its management training program and otherwise provide managers with an orientation on the development and use of strategic planning and program performance measurement.

SECTION 10. APPLICATION OF ACT.

No provision or amendment made by this Act may be construed as-

(1) creating any right, privilege, benefit, or entitlement for any person who is not an officer or employee of the United States acting in such capacity, and no person who is not an officer or employee of the United States acting in such capacity shall have standing to file any civil action in a court of the United States to enforce any provision or amendment made by this Act; or

(2) superseding any statutory requirement, including any requirement under section 553 of title 5, United States Code.

SECTION 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Amendment to Title 5, United States Code.-The table of sections for chapter 3 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to section 305 the following:

"306. Strategic plans.".

(b) Amendments to Title 31, United States Code.-

(1) Amendment to chapter 11.-The table of sections for chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to section 1114 the following:

"1115. Performance plans.

"1116. Program performance reports.

"1117. Exemptions.

"1118. Pilot projects for performance goals.

"1119. Pilot projects for performance budgeting.".

(2) Amendment to chapter 97.-The table of sections for chapter 97 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to section 9702 the following:

"9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility.

"9704. Pilot projects for managerial accountability and flexibility.".

(c) Amendment to Title 39, United States Code.-The table of chapters for part III of title 39, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

"28. Strategic planning and performance management 2801".

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.